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A Labor Theoretic Analysis of the 
Criminal Choice 
By M. K. BLOCK AND J. M. REINEKE* 
"Much of the security of person and 
property in modern nations is the effect 
of manners and opinion rather than 
law." 
John Stuart Mill 
Principles of Political Economy 
Recently, a number of economists have 
applied modern choice theory to the study 
of illegal or criminal activities. Almost 
without exception, they have emphasized 
the similarity between the decision to 
commit an offense and the traditional 
household choice problem. As Gary Becker 
in his pioneering article expresses the 
proposition: "Some persons become 'crim-
inals' ... not because their basic motiva-
tion differs from that of other persons, 
but because their benefits and costs differ" 
(p. 176). Although this point is well taken, 
we find that a number of recent contribu-
tions do not provide an adequate frame-
work for analyzing the costs and benefits 
of an important class of illegal activities. 
In particular, Becker, Isaac Ehrlich, and 
David Sjoquist summarize the conse-
quences of time-consuming illegal activi-
ties in terms of a distribution on wealth 
alone without fully considering the under-
lying multiattribute choice problem. 1 
* Associate professors of economics, Naval Post· 
graduate School and University of Santa Clara, respec-
tively. \Ve are indebted to James Sweeney, Hayne 
Leland, Agnar Sandmo, and Henry Demmert for their 
comments and suggestions. Tn addition, we would like to 
acknowledge the comments of a referee which have been 
most helpful in clarifying several portions of our argu-
ment. An earlier version of this paper was read at the 
European Meetings of the Econometric Society 1973. 
1 Michael Allingham and Agnar Sandmo, Serge-
Christophe Kolm, and Balbir Singh also have papers on 
the criminal choice problem. But each of these papers is 
concerned with income tax evasion, an activity in which 
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The commission of most offenses results 
in an expenditure of effort, the possibility 
of an increase in the individual's wealth 
position, and the possibility of a penalty. 
Aside from the penalty, the similarity be-
tween such offense decisions and labor 
supply decisions under uncertainty is obvi-
ous.2 Moreover, if the penalty is a mone-
tary payment, the analogy is precise. 
Although many criminal choice prob-
lems may be viewed within an expanded 
labor choice framework, care must be 
exercised if these problems are to be inter-
preted in terms of strictly monetary costs 
and benefits. We show below that by not 
fully specifying their choice problems, and 
therefore the transformation between what 
is inherently a multiattribute decision 
problem and the wealth-only problem, 
Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist are led to 
conclusions which are valid only in very 
special cases. In general, we show that 
plausible preference restrictions are not 
sufficient to generate unambiguous supply 
results, a result that should come as no 
surprise since it is the same situation that 
confronts the investigator in most house-
"labor" may be a relatively insignificant input. If this 
is the case, modeling the decision problem as a choice 
over wealth orderings is appropriate. However, for the 
criminal choice in general, the labor attribute will be 
significant and must be included in the agent's prefer-
ence orderings. For this reason, most of our attention 
will be focused on the papers of Becker, Ehrlich, and 
Sjoquist who model the general criminal choice prob-
lem. Allingham and Sandmo are aware that several 
attributes must in general be included in the individual's 
decision problem and examine certain aspects of this 
problem in one section of their paper. 
2 See the authors (1973a) for an analysis of the labor 
supply decision when returns are stochastic. 
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hold allocation problems.3 Therefore, pol-
icy prescriptions in this area, as in the tax 
incentive area, do not follow from theory 
but rather require empirical determination 
of relative magnitudes. 
We proceed as follows: First, the indi-
vidual's labor-offense supply problem is 
formulated in terms of the underlying 
multiattributed nature of the problem. 
Next, supply responses to various param-
eter shifts are investigated. As would be 
expected, under "usual" preference re-
strictions these responses are ambiguous in 
sign. Finally, since unambiguous results 
have been reported in the literature, the 
last section and the Appendix are devoted 
to determining the conditions under which 
unequivocal supply effects obtain. 
I. The Joint Supply of Labor and Offenses 
In the analysis which follows we restrict 
our attention to property crimes, which 
enables us to concentrate on what George 
Stigler refers to as "production offenses." 
Specifically, we consider an individual who 
is confronted with two wealth generating 
activities, legal activity (labor) and illegal 
activity (theft) and denote the time spent 
in these activities as LandT, respectively. 
Hence, the individual's evaluation of his 
well-being at any point in time will be a 
function of the time spent generating 
wealth and the level of his wealth, i.e., 
(1) U = U(L, T, W) 
where U is the agent's von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility indicator, and W rep-
resents wealth, with Uw>O, UL<O, and 
UT<O. By including the arguments Land 
T explicitly in U, we are provided with a 
straightforward means of analyzing the 
role of moral and ethical considerations 
which may constrain the work-theft de-
cision. 
3 In particular, the agent's simple behavior toward 
risk contains qualitative supply implications only in 
highly restrictive circumstances. 
The following definitions will be used: 
r= the rate of return to legal activity 
V = the rate of return to illegal activity 
a= the stochastic failure, capture, or 
arrest rate, 0 ~a~ 1 
0= the number of offenses, 
O=O(T) andO'(T)>O 
F= the fine per offense 
TV= W 0+rL+(V -aF)O(T), 
actual wealth 4 
N=time devoted to nonmarket activity 
t=L+T+N 
Note that the penalty for an offense is 
specified as a fine. This penalty specifica-
tion enables us to focus on an issue of 
central concern in this paper, the role of 
psychic costs in the offense decision.5 
A. The Model 
According to the expected utility theo-
rem, the individual's labor-theft supply 
decision is determined by 
(2) max f U[L, T, W 0 + rL 
L,T 
+ (V - aF)O]f(a)da 
subject to the condition that labor and 
theft levels be nonnegative. In (2), J(a) is 
the agent's subjective probability density 
on the arrest rate and indicates the agent's 
beliefs as to the intervals in which the 
arrest rate is likely to lie. To facilitate 
comparison to the existing literature, we 
adopt the specification used in Ehrlich, 
Sjoquist, and Morgan Reynolds and fix 
4 \Ve use the term "actual wealth" to denote the 
wealth that an individual has available to meet financial 
obligations. It is initial wealth W 0 plus earnil}gs or 
losses during the period under consideration; W is a 
particular value of W. 
5 While the introduction of a prison sentence would 
complicate the analysis, it would not invalidate the 
basic argument which follows. In addition, according 
to Becker, pp. 193-98, fines are not only the most com-
mon form of punishment, but also the most "efficient." 
For an analysis in which prison sentences are formally 
introduced into the choice problem, see Block and 
Robert Lind. 
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the amount of time allocated to nonmarket 
activities.6 Further, the number of offenses 
is assumed to be proportional to the time 
devoted to their production. Under these 
assumptions the first-order condition for a 
relative maxima requires that 
(3) E[UT- UL + Uw((V- aF)O'- r)] :::=:; 0 
where (}'=-d(}jdT. As would be expected, 
when the psychic cost of effort is afforded 
its traditional labor theoretic role, the 
agent's simple behavior toward risk (sign 
U ww) has no unique allocative implica-
tions.7 Hence, Ehrlich's assertion, p. 528, 
that preferences toward risk and relative 
returns alone determine the degree of 
specialization will not hold in general. 
Only in a special case where "returns" 
include a strong assumption concerning 
psychic costs is such a statement valid. 8 
In general, the time allocation between 
L and T will depend not only upon the 
agent's behavior toward risk and relative 
returns but also upon the relative "irk-
someness" of alternative occupations. 
By way of illustration, consider an in-
dividual for which U L- U T > 0 for all L, 
T, and W. We might say such an indi-
vidual has a preference for honesty. If he 
is also risk averse, then a necessary but 
s That is, N =N, a constant. 
7 Notice that although only first derivatives of U 
appear in (3), a necessary condition for signing the 
term EUw(V-aF) is knowledge of sign[Uww]. To see 
this note that EUw(V-aF)=Cov(Uw, V-aF)+ 
E(Uw)E(V -a F) and that sign [Cov(Uw, V -aF)] de-
pends upon how Uw changes with changes in V -aF (on 
the average). To illustrate, consider an increase in the 
value of a (a decrease in V- a F). Now decreases in 
V -aF cause decreases in TV which in turn cause Uw to 
either increase or decrease depending upon whether 
Uww is negative or positive. So if Uww<O then de-
creases in V- aF cause increases in U w and U w and 
V -aF move in opposite directions on the average, i.e., 
Cov(Uw, V-aF)<O. Similar arguments show Uww>O 
implies Cov(Uw, V-aF)>O and Uww=O implies 
Cov(Uw, V-aF)=O. In general a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for signing product expectations 
containing unrestricted random variables is sign knowl-
edge on derivatives of one higher order than those ap-
pearing in the expectation. 
s This point is discussed in more detail below. 
not sufficient condition for T>O is that 
the returns to illegal activity be greater 
than expected costs (where costs consist of 
the average penalty plus legal opportuni-
ties foregone). For this condition to also 
be sufficient for T>O, returns must be 
sufficiently high to outweigh the psychic 
disadvantage of participation in illegal 
acts. In addition, increasing the certainty 
of arrest, increasing penalties, or increasing 
legal opportunities until "crime does not 
pay," (V-E(a)F)(}'-r<O, will deter this 
group of offenders. On the other hand, if 
the individual displays both a preference 
for risk and honesty, making "crime not 
pay" may not deter participation. 9 
II. Supply Behavior and Policy Changes10 
In this section, we pose a number of 
questions concerning the supply behavior 
of a single economic agent. In particular, 
we investigate the agent's supply response 
to changes in (i) initial wealth, (ii) the 
payoff to illegal activity, (iii) the arrest 
rate, and (iv) the severity of punishment. 
In most of the comparative static de-
rivatives which follow, second derivatives 
of U appear in product expectations. This 
points up a well-known characteristic of 
stochastic models, viz., that a qualitative 
analysis of parameter shifts in these 
models often requires third derivative 
information concerning the agent's utility 
indicatorY The customary method of 
providing this information is to postulate 
plausible hypotheses regarding the agent's 
'Risk-averse individuals with a preference for illegal 
activities, UL-UT<O, may not be deterred by making 
crime not pay in this sense. 
1o In the discussion that follows, we assume internal 
solutions exist to first-order conditions. 
11 This statement is an application of the principle 
stated at the end of fn. 7. So, for example, a necessary 
condition for signing the term EUww(V -a F)= 
Cov(Uww, V -aF)+ E(Uww)I~(V- a F) which appears 
in equation (4), is sign[aUww!a(V-aF) ]. That is, 
sign[Cov(Uww, V-aF)] depends upon how Uww 
changes as V -aF changes. Hence, sign[Uwww] is 
needed. 
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behavior toward risk as various arguments 
of the utility indicator change. For ex-
ample, the multiattribute analog of the 
Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion func-
tion, R= - U ww / U w, has been termed 
the conditional (absolute) risk aversion 
for wealth by Ralph Keeney. If the agent 
becomes increasingly willing to accept a 
wealth gamble of a given size as his wealth 
increases, ceteris paribus, he is said to 
display decreasing absolute risk aversion 
in wealth (aR/aW <0), a hypothesis we 
shall adopt. This restriction on the agent's 
preferences has been widely utilized and 
has led to many interesting results. 12 
A. Wealth Effects 
A question of considerable interest to 
both criminologists and economists is the 
effect on the level of criminal activity of 
changes in the offender's "initial wealth." 
For example, would increased welfare 
payments have incentive or disincentive 
effects on the supply of offenses? To in-
vestigate this question, differentiate (3) 
\\'ith respect to W 0• In which case 
(4) aTjaW0 = E[ULw- UTw 
- Uww((V- aF)8'- r)]/FTT 
where F=EU(L, T, W). 
Clearly, knowledge of the individual's 
simple behavior toward risk (sign Uww) 
will not provide sufficient information to 
deduce the inferiority (or perhaps normal-
ity) of illegal activity; nor for that matter, 
will the combination of, say, risk aversion 
and decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
Only a priori considerations can sign 
aT/aW0 at this level of generality. 
B. Payoff Effects 
To our knowledge, most of the research 
on illegal activities has focused directly on 
deterrence, and hence payoff effects on the 
12 See, for example, Sandmo (1970, 1971), Hayne 
Leland (1968, 1972), Jan Mossin (1968a,b), and Block 
and Reineke (1972, 1973a). 
supply of these activities have been largely 
ignored. 13 This neglect appears even in 
much of the recent economics of crime 
literature. For example, although Becker 
includes "net returns" in his formulation, 
it is not central to his supply of offenses 
analysis. Certainly, any analysis of prop-
erty crimes must include an examination 
of payoff effects as a matter of central 
concern. To this end, write 
(5) aTjav = - EUw8'/FTT + 8aTjawo 
Equation (5) is the stochastic analog of the 
familiar Slutsky expression and is com-
posed of a substitution effect and a wealth 
effect. Since F TT and ()' are negative and 
positive, respectively, the substitution 
term is positive. Hence, the direction of 
the supply response will depend upon the 
wealth effect. If theft is an inferior activ-
ity, no qualitative conclusions are forth-
coming.14 
Of course, this comes as no surprise. 
Economists have long known that "price 
effects" in household decision models are 
ambiguous in sign. Without further prefer-
ence information, the necessary condition 
for a positive supply response is the nor-
mality (or wealth independence) of illegal 
activity. Without this condition, the possi-
bility that theft is a Giffen activity cannot 
be dismissed. 
C. Enforcement Effects 
In the model being investigated in this 
paper, uncertainty is introduced through 
the enforcement variable a. The payoff and 
penalty are both assumed to be known but 
the frequency of penalty imposition (the 
arrest rate) a is taken by the agent to be 
a continuous random variable, 0:::; a:::; 1. 
This specification is a generalization of the 
13 See Clarence Schrag, pp. 2(}-113, for a brief survey 
of the criminology literature in this area. 
14 Of course this statement remains valid a fortiori if 
the time allocation to nonmarket activities is endog-
enously determined. 
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Bernoulli formulation used by Becker, 
Ehrlich, and Sjoquist. (See the Appendix.) 
The relation between the offense deci-
sion and changes in the degree of enforce-
ment has been a topic of long-standing 
::peculation. But because the arrest rate is 
a random variable there is no unique inter-
pretation of an increase in enforcement. 
However, an intuitive approach is to con-
sider changes in enforcement procedures 
that increase the expected number of ar-
rests but leave all other moments of j(a) 
unaltered. That is, we consider a "pure" 
increase in the arrest rate. This may be ac-
complished by replacing a in ( 3) with a+ o 
where o is a mean altering, dispersion pre-
serving parameter. Differentiating with 
respect too and evaluating at o=O yields: 
(6) aTjaa = - F(aT;av) 
As we have noted, without relative magni-
tude information, aTjaV is unambigu-
ously signed only if aTjaW0 ~0. Hence, 
for this class of penalties, we are able to 
assert unequivocally the deterrent effect of 
increases in the arrest rate (aTjao <0) only 
by assuming the normality (or wealth in-
dependence) of illegal activity. 
D. Penalty Effects 
In the past decade we have witnessed a 
heated polemic concerning the effects of 
changes in the severity of punishment on 
the crime rate. Protagonists of the "lib-
eral" position have often claimed that 
increasing the severity of punishment has 
little or no deterrent effect on the supply 
of offenses, while more "conservative" 
individuals have denounced this group as 
"soft on crime" and recommended in-
creased penalties to combat growing crime 
rates. Although much of this argument has 
been couched in ideological considerations, 
the central question concerning the supply 
effects of changes in the severity of pun-
ishment is a major concern of policy mak-
ers. We now consider this question in the 
context of the present model. 
The first-order conditions (3) indicate 
that the net rate of return to theft, the 
individual's behavior toward risk, and his 
"ethics," jointly determine the offense 
level. Hence, by examining (3) one can 
find several combinations of ethics and 
behavior toward risk which would result 
in zero offenses for sufficiently severe 
penalties. For example, if the world were 
comprised of risk-averse individuals who 
display honesty preference, ( U L- U T) > 0, 
then the supply of offenses could be driven 
to zero by making F sufficiently large. 15 
However, this is not likely to be possible, 
and if not, the question of the supply re-
sponse to a change in the severity of the 
penalty must be formulated in terms of 
marginal changes in the penalty. 
Since F is deterministic in the present 
model, the interpretation of a change in the 
penalty is straightforward. In fact, in-
creases in F act as scale changes on the 
random variable a, decreasing expected 
returns and increasing the dispersion of 
returns. Formally, 
(7) aTjaF = E(Uwa)fJ'/FTT 
+ fJE\a[UTw- ULw+ Uww 
·((V- aF)fJ'- r)]}/FTT 
Inspection of (7) reveals the substitu-
tion effect of a change in penalty to be 
negative and the wealth effect to be un-
signed without further preference informa-
tion. Hence, at least at the present level 
of generality, arguments alleging the dis-
incentive effects of increases in the sever-
ity of punishment are not unambiguously 
supported by theory. 
We have seen that if the multiattributed 
nature of the individual's decision problem 
is fully accounted for, then the "usual" 
preference restrictions concerning the in-
dividual's behavior toward risk will not 
15 See Block and TJind for a discussion of the limits of 
the criminal sanction. 
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provide sufficient information to sign the 
supply effects of increased "payoffs," 
"enforcement," and "penalties." The core 
of the problem is of course the fact that 
wealth effects are unsigned. And, assuming 
theft to be an inferior activity does not 
alleviate the ambiguity, since relative mag-
nitude difficulties then arise in each case. 
III. Ethical Costs and Wealth: 
The Case of Independence 
Up to this point, we have analyzed the 
offense decision as a generalized labor 
supply problem. As we have seen, the 
price of this generality is qualitative am-
biguity.16 In particular, the unambiguous 
results reported by Becker, Ehrlich, and 
Sjoquist are not forthcoming when the 
offense decision is analyzed as a general 
multiattribute decision problem. 17 An in-
teresting question thus arises. What as-
sumptions concerning the agent's utility 
function are implicit in the several un-
ambiguous results reported by these 
authors? Or more generally, given the 
supply problem posed in (2), under what 
conditions do changes in the various com-
ponents of the return to illegal activity 
lead to unambiguous supply responses? 
It is to this question that we now turn. 
Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist have 
analyzed the criminal choice using a special 
form of (2) in which all costs and benefits 
associated with criminal activity have 
been expressed in terms of wealth alone. 
That is, in their models L and T do not 
enter the utility function directly as at-
tributes, but rather affect the level of util-
1' Again, this ambiguity persists a fortiori if the time 
allocated to nonmarket activities is not fixed. 
17 The only exception to this statement is the response 
of offenses to a change in a when f(a) is Bernoulli, a re-
sult reported by all three authors. Although this result 
does hold after the multiattributed structure of the 
problem is incorporated into the model, it holds only 
because the arrest rate is assumed to he Bernoulli dis-
tributed. Some of the implications of assumingj(a) to be 
Bernoulli are discussed in the Appendix. 
ity indirectly through their effects on 
wealth. For example, Becker writes, costs 
" ... can be made comparable by convert-
ing them into their monetary equiva-
lent ... " (p. 179), while Ehrlich defines 
the individual's wealth so that it includes 
" ... assets, earnings within the period 
and the 'real wealth' equivalent of non-
pecuniary returns from legitimate and 
illegitimate activity ... " (p. 525). Or, in 
the words of Sjoquist: "The psychic gain 
is measured by that quantity of money 
which the individual is willing to pay to 
obtain the psychic gain" (p. 439). To 
contrast the present model with the work 
of these authors, we reformulate the above 
problem and express the psychic cost of 
L and T in terms of their wealth equiva-
lents. 
Formally, the problem posed in (2) may 
be reduced to an equivalent single at-
tribute problem by defining a level of 
wealth W* such that U(L, T, TV)= U(O, 
0, W*). Clearly, W- W* is the wealth 
equivalent of L hours of legal activity and 
T hours of illegal activity. 18 In general, the 
wealth equivalent will be a function, say 
d A 0 19 C, of L, T, an W; 1.e., 
(8) W - W* = C(L, T, W) 
Using (8), we may write 
(9) U(L, T, W) -
U(O, 0, W- C(L, T, W)) 
ts A case in which the wealth equivalent of T hours 
of illegal activity does not exist occurs when (aW;aT)uo 
fails to exist for all L, T, and W. An individual possess-
ing such an ethic might he said to he absolutely honest. 
In this case, one has a family of utility indicators para-
metric on T which are lexicographically ordered by T. 
Formally, let va(Ta, L, W) represent a family of utility 
indicators parametric on Ta, where OI<A, an index set. 
Then absolute honesty implies Va0 > va• iff Ta0 <Ta*, 
for all L and W. The set {va}, mA, is only partially 
lexicographically ordered since if Ta0 =Ta*, then 
Va0 < va• depending upon the values of Land W. 
19 A unique wealth equivalent exists (and hence the 
function C) iff UL, UT, and Uw are continuous, mono-
tonic functions of their arguments and Uw>O every-
where. 
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One can analyze the choice problem at 
hand in terms of either the right-hand or 
left-hand side of (9). On the right-hand 
side the attributes L and T have been 
collapsed into their wealth equivalents, 
leaving the single attribute utility indi-
cator, U(O, 0, W*). For brevity, we define 
U(O, 0, W*) = U(W*). Of course, nothing 
has been changed since the individual's 
orderings over the single attribute 
Tf1 - C(L, T, TV) are equivalent to his 
orderings over the attributes L, T, TV 20 
Kote that the single attribute formulation 
treats psychic costs (benefits) as a simple 
subtraction (addition) from (to) wealth 
and hence, is the analytic justification for 
the approach adopted by Becker, Ehrlich, 
and Sjoquist in which psychic costs and 
returns are reduced to their monetary 
equivalent and then combined with mone-
tary returns and costs. Unfortunately, 
none of these authors has derived his 
model from the underlying multiattri-
buted structure of preferences, with the 
consequence that the results reported in 
each paper are valid only for a special 
case. In terms of the utility indicator 
U(TV- C(L, T, TV)), their special case is 
equivalent to assuming the function C is 
independent of wealth, i.e., C= C(L, T) 
or Cw=0. 21 \Ve now turn our attention to 
several implications of this assumption. 
A. Wealth E.ffects (Cw=O) 
As we have seen, traditional restrictions 
on preference orderings are insufficient to 
establish the effect of changes in initial 
wealth on the allocation of time to criminal 
activities. Hence the supply effects of 
changes in the payoff to illegal activity, 
2° For a detailed discussion of wealth erJuivalence, 
see Block and Heinekc (1973h). 
21 For example, Ehrlich's equations (1.2) and (1.3), 
p. 525, and Sjoquist's equations (2) an<l (-1-), p. 4-1-1, all 
imply that the psychic costs and benefits of both legal 
and illegal activity are independent of wealth. For a 
more detailed discussion of this point, see Block and 
Reineke (1974). 
the degree of enforcement, and the sever-
ity of punishment are unsigned. However, 
if attention is focused on the special case 
analyzed by Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist, 
in which the monetary equivalent of the 
psychic cost of legal and illegal activity C 
is independent of wealth, then the wealth 
effect is signed and likewise are the effects 
of changes in the payoff, enforcement, and 
punishment. To see this we reformulate 
the supply problem given in (2) by re-
placing U(L, T, TV) with U(TV -C(L, 
T)). 22 In which case equation (4) becomes 
(4') aTjaW0 = - EUww[(V- aF)&' 
- r + CL- CT]/HTT 
where H=EU(TV -C(L, T)). 
As is obvious, the agent's simple behav-
ior toward risk (sign Uww) provides suffi-
cient information for signing (4') only in 
the trivial case of risk neutrality, in which 
case the individual's time allocation to 
theft is invariant to changes in W 0 • Gen-
erally, third derivative information will 
be needed. 23 If the individual is risk averse, 
the Arrow-Pratt measure provides the 
needed information. It can be shown that 
if this measure decreases in wealth 
(aR/aW <0), then the numerator of (-l') 
is negative. 24 The crucial requirement, 
which is absent in the general case where 
C=C(L, T, Tl1), is that the non-linear por-
tion of the wealth constraint be nonran-
dom. This is precisely the effect of making 
C independent of wealth. \Ve now have 
(10) aT;awo > o 
If the pyschic costs of effort are indepen-
dent of wealth, and if the agent exhibits 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, then 
22 To simplify notation in what follows, Uw will be 
used to represent dU(ll'*)/dW*. 
23 See fnn. 11 and 7 for a discussion of this point. 
24 For prouf of a formally· identical preposition, see 
Sandmo's (1971, pp. 68-69) demonstration of the nega-
tive output effects associated with changes in fixed costs. 
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effort expended generating income via 
illegal activity will increase with wealth. 
In other words, given the widely employed 
and currently unrefuted hypothesis of 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, the 
Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist specifica-
tions imply theft is a normal activity. 25 
We now briefly reexamine the other 
supply effects reported above for the case 
where C and W are independent. 
B. Payoff Effects (Cw= 0) 
For the case at hand, equation (5) 
above becomes 
(5') aT;av = - EUwO'/HTT + eaTjawo 
The substitution effect in (5') is positive 
and as we have seen under the Arrow-
Pratt hypothesis the wealth effect is also 
positive. Hence, if psychic costs are in-
variant in wealth and if absolute risk 
aversion decreases in wealth, then the 
agent will unambiguously devote more 
hours to illegal activity as the return to 
these activities increases. 
C. Enforcement Effects (Cw=O) 
Derivative (6) above is of course still 
(6') aTjao = - F(aTjaV) 
where o is the mean altering, dispersion 
preserving, additive shift parameter on 
the random variable a. But as has been 
noted, with C w= 0 decreasing absolute 
risk a version implies aT/ a V> 0 and there-
fore increases in the arrest rate will pro-
duce an unambiguous deterrent effect on 
the supply of offenses. 
D. Penalty Effects (Cw=O) 
When Cw=O, the penalty effect re-
ported in equation (7) becomes 
25 Since the time allocations to income generating 
activities is fixed, i.e., N = N, inequality (10) implies 
aL;aw•<o. 
(7') aTjaF = E(Uwa)O'/HTT 
+ OE[Uww((V- aF)O'- r 
+ CL- CT)a]/HTT 
Since U w and a are each nonnegative 
random variables, the first term in this ex-
pression is negative. In addition, it is 
easy to show that decreasing absolute risk 
aversion implies the numerator of the 
second term is positive. 26 Therefore, both 
terms are negative and we have the result 
reported by Becker, p. 177, Ehrlich, p. 
529, and Sjoquist, p. 441: Increases in 
"punishment" unequivocally reduce the 
incentive to engage in illegal activities. 
Again the independence of psychic costs 
and wealth implicit in the Becker, Ehrlich, 
and Sjoquist models eliminates the am-
biguity reported for the general case. 
E. Pure Dispersion Changes 
We now turn our attention to an addi-
tional and very interesting parameter 
shift, a shift discussed by Becker, Ehrlich, 
and Kolm. 
The relation between the offense deci-
sion and the degree of certainty with 
which the penalty is administered has been 
deb a ted endlessly by criminologists. Well 
over a century and a half ago, Sir Samuel 
Romilly, in a series of debates with 
William Paley, held that not only did cer-
tainty of punishment deter criminal ac-
tivities, but also that certainty of punish-
ment was more crucial then severity. 
"So evident is the truth of this maxim that 
if it were possible that punishment could 
26To see this, let Z=(V-aF)8'-r+C~,-CT and let 
W 0 he that wealth level such that Z=O. We must show 
R(UwwZa) >0. If Z>O then aR< (aR)o where (aR)o 
signifies that the product aR is evaluated at Wo and 
hence is nonrandom. Therefore, -ZaUww<(aR)oUwZ. 
If Z <0 the analogous argument yields the same result. 
Hence, - E(UwwZa) < (aR)oflCUwZ). But E(UwZ) is 
the necessary condition for an internal maximum and 
must he zero. Therefore, F.(UwwZa) >0. Note that if 
(a) is Bernoulli, risk a version alone signs (7'). See the 
Appendix. 
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be reduced to an absolute certainty, a 
very slight penalty would be sufficient to 
deter almost every species of crime .... "27 
\Ve next determine whether the present 
model contains any implications concern-
ing the deterrent effects of increases in the 
certainty of punishment. 
A widely utilized method of studying 
the effects of changes in the dispersion of 
a random variable consists of using a com-
bination of a multiplicative and an addi-
tive parameter shift on the variable in 
question. The multiplicative shift 
"spreads" the density, while the additive 
shift is used to keep the mean of the vari-
able unchanged. 28 To assess the supply 
effects of a change in the dispersion of 
punishment, we apply the additive shift 
parameter to a, say "(, which in turn acts 
as a multiplicative shift on F. The param-
eter 'Y is restricted to ensure E( a F) is 
unchanged. 29 It is interesting to note that 
dispersion changes generated in this man-
ner are formally identical to the changes 
in the probability of arrest "compen-
sated" by changes in the penalty reported 
by Becker, p. 178, Ehrlich, p. 530, and 
Kolm, p. 266.30 
Differentiating the right-hand side of 
(9) first with respect to T, then with re-
spect to 'Y and evaluating the result at 
"(= 0, we have31 
(11) aTja'Y = - (F/E(a)) { Cov (Uw, a)O' 
+ 0 Cov [Uww((V- aF)O' 
- r + CL- CT), a]} /HTT 
Unlike the other comparative static re-
27 This debate is reported in Jerome Michael and 
Herbert Wechsler, p. 250ff. 
28 For example, see Sandmo (1970, 1971), Leland 
(1972), and Block and Reineke (1973a). 
29 Formally, dF:(a+r)F/dr=O and hence dF/dr= 
-F/R(a) whenr=O. 
30 This point is also noted in Brown and Reynolds, 
pp. 512-13. See the Appendix for a more detailed dis-
cussion. 
31 Of course, Cw=O in this derivative. If not, there is 
no possibility of extracting qualitative information. 
suits reported in this section, decreasing 
absolute risk aversion will not be sufficient 
to sign (11). For risk-averse agents Cov 
( U w, a) is positive, but nonlinearities in 
"ethical costs" C L- C T, prevent further 
analysis of the second covariance term. 
It would seem that this term can be 
signed only if the function C(L, T) is lin-
ear. An individual for which this condi-
tion holds might be said to display ethical 
independence,32 in which case it can be 
shown that oR/oW <0 implies the second 
covariance m (11) is positive and there-
fore33 
(12) aTfh > o 
Given the preference restrictions which 
have been enumerated, the model sup-
ports the hypothesis that increases in the 
certainty of punishment will induce dis-
incentive effects. However, this seemingly 
very plausible result that increases in the 
certainty of punishment will discourage 
criminal activity, a hypothesis often ac-
cepted as fact, rests upon the assumptions 
that psychic costs are independent of 
wealth and that the criminal choice prob-
lem is characterized by what Arrow has 
32 Formally, if U=U(L, T, W), K is a constant and 
(oW /oT)uo- (oW /oL)uo= K, L, T, W20, the indi-
vidual is ethically independent. Agents whose orderings 
display ethical independence have the same relative 
"taste (distaste) for crime" no matter what their 
wealth may be and no matter how involved they might 
he in legal and illegal activities. In other words, the 
agent's ethical considerations are independent of both 
his wealth and his participation rates in income gen-
erating activities. If K =0 in the definition, we might 
say the individual is "ethically neutral." Ethically 
neutral individuals find legal and illegal activity equally 
distasteful and in effect combine them under the head-
ing "work." These individuals probably most ade-
quately represent the caricature of "economic man." 
33 Define Z== (V -aF)O' -~·+CL-CT. We are to show 
Cov (UwwZ,a) == E [UwwZ (a -val] >0. Note that 
Z-p.z==(a-,..a)(-Fe') and hence R[UwwZ(a-p.a)]== 
-Fe'E(UwwZ(Z-p.z) ]= -Fe'[RUwwZ'-p.zFUwwZ]. 
For risk-averse individuals RUwwZ'<O and if 
oR/oW <0, then EUwwZ>O by (10) above. The only 
remaining unsigned term is llZ· If the individual exhibits 
ethical independence, the necessary condition for a 
nonzero supply of offenses is p.z > 0. Therefore, the term 
in brackets is negative and Cov(UwwZ, a) >0. 
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called "constant stochastic returns." In 
other words, the deterrent effect of "small" 
increases in the certainty of punishment is 
straightforward to establish only when 
the criminal choice is modeled as a port-
folio problem. Thus the results concerning 
the certainty of punishment reported by 
Becker, Ehrlich, and Kolm for the case 
where j(a) is Bernoulli, are not forthcom-
ing in the general case.34 
IV. Summary 
We have examined in some detail the 
individual's choice among two income-
generating and time-consuming alterna-
tives, one legal with certain returns and 
one illegal with stochastic returns. Unlike 
the existing literature in the area, this 
problem was formulated in terms of the 
underlying multiattributed structure of 
preferences inherent in the decision prob-
lem. Utilizing this basic framework and 
carefully specifying the relationship be-
tween the multiattribute problem and its 
single attribute equivalent, we have shown 
that the results obtained by previous auth-
ors are valid only in special cases. Most 
significantly, changes in (i) wealth, (ii) 
the payoff to illegal activity, (iii) enforce-
ment, (iv) punishment, and (v) the degree 
of certainty surrounding punishment were 
seen to have no qualitative supply implica-
tions under traditional preference restric-
tions. 
Simplifications which may appear to be 
forthcoming in a "wealth only" model are 
the result of a failure to fully specify the 
transformation between the underlying 
multiattribute model and its single attri-
bute equivalent. Hence, in the area of law 
enforcement as in taxation, policy recom-
mendations do not follow from theory but 
34 To interpret aT ja-y in terms of the Becker, Ehrlich, 
and Kolm results, note that a is increased and F is de-
creased such that J':(aP) is constant. Since aTja-y>O, 
the decrease in F has the greater effect on T. (See the 
Appendix.) 
rather require empirical determination of 
relative magnitudes. 
APPENDIX 
The Bernoulli as Subjectit•e Density 
In the analysis above we assumed only the 
existence of a subjective probability distribu-
tion j( a). This is a much more general ap-
proach than has been adopted in previous 
work. Becker's pioneering work in the area 
and the Ehrlich and Sjoquist extensions as-
sume a is either 1 or 0 with j(1) = p and 
j(O) = 1- p; i.e., j(a) is Bernoulli. This im-
plies that the individual makes decisions 
as if the only possible outcomes are total 
failure or complete success, although it is 
difficult to imagine a situation in which the 
individual would be either caught for every 
offense or not caught at all. This is in contrast 
to the above formulation in which the "arrest 
rate" may take on any value between 0 and 
1 and hence the individual is confronted with 
a continuum of failure possibilities.35 He fails 
on none, on all, or on any fraction of his at-
tempted offenses. While both Ehrlich and 
Becker seem to suggest that their results are 
forthcoming for more general densities, as 
the results above indicate, this is not the 
case.36 
To see the implications of this density, de-
fine TV'== TV 0+rL+(V -F)O and TV"== TV 0+ 
rL+ VO and let f(a) be Bernoulli. In this 
case, 
(A1) EU = pU(L, T, TV') 
+ (1- p)U(L, T, TV") 
which in wealth equivalent form is 
(A2) EU=pU(TV'-C(L, T, Tl")) 
+(1-p)U(TV"-C(L, T, TV")) 
2\Jote that equation (A2) is the Ehrlich model 
if C(L, T, TV) is not subsumed into V and 
V-F.37 
35 See Reineke for further discussion of this point. 
36 For example, Ehrlich states, "Although our model 
has been illustrated for two states of the world, the 
analysis equally well applies to n states ... " (p. 528). 
37 There does remain one minor difference between 
the model in (A2) and the Ehrlich formulation. Ehrlich 
allows for variable punishment by considering a punish-
ment function F(O). 
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(A4) aTjay = { -Uw(W)[(VO'- r)(l- Cw(L, T, W')) + CL(L, T, W')- CT(L, T, W')] 
+ Uw(!!')[(VO'- r)(l- Cw(L, T, W")) + CL(L, T, W")- CT(L, T, W")] 
- FOUw(W)[CLw(L, T, W')- CTw(L, T, W')- Cww(L, T, W')((V- F)O'- r)] 
- FOUww(W)(l- Cw(L, T, W'))(((V- F)O'- r)(l- Cw(L, T, W')) 
+ CL(L, T, W')- CT(L, T, W')Jl/GTT 
The essential elements of the preference 
restrictions underpinning the Becker, Ehrlich, 
and Sjoquist models may be seen by examin-
ing but one of the above supply effects: the 
effect on illegal activity of a "compensated" 
increase in the arrest rate. A compensated 
increase in the arrest rate consists of an in-
crease in the arrest rate compensated by a 
decrease in the penalty, so that the effect of 
both changes is to leave the expected punish-
ment pF unchanged. While Becker and 
Ehrlich employ equal and opposite percent-
age changes in p and F to accomplish this 
compensated change, it may also be per-
formed by simply setting 
d(pF)/dp = F + p(dF/dp) = 0 
and hence dF/ dp is equal to - F / p. This lat-
ter approach has the advantage of em-
phasizing the relationship between com-
pensated changes in p and the more general 
dispersion changes discussed above. Within 
the Bernoulli framework, the Becker-Ehrlich 
compensated change is a change in the dis-
persion of returns to illegal activity. 
To proceed, note that 
(A3) aT;a'Y = aT;ap- (aTjaF)(F/p) 
where 8T/8'Y is the effect on illegal activity 
of a mean preserving (or compensated) 
change in p, and aTjap and aTjaF are the 
effects on T of changes in p and F, respec-
tively. The individual's optimal level of il-
legal activity is obtained by maximizing 
either (A1) or (A2). Since we are interested 
in isolating the preference restrictions under-
pinning the Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist 
results, it is most convenient to pose the de-
cision problem in its wealth equivalent form, 
(A2). To reduce the notation, define W = W' 
-C(L, T, TF') and TV= W" -C(L, T, W"). 
Equation (A3) may now be written as 
shown in equation (A4) where G= pU(W) 
+(1-p)U(W). \Ve now note that in gen-
era!, and contrary to the assertions made 
by both Becker, p. 178, and Ehrlich, p. 530, 
simple behavior toward risk (sign U ww) 
is not sufficient to establish the qualitative 
effect of a compensated change in p. That 
is, the sign of (A4) is not determined by 
sign Uww-one also needs information on 
the properties of the "cost" function C. 
We now show that only in a special case is 
it possible to infer the sign of (A4) from the 
sign of U ww and also to infer the sign of U ww 
from the sign of (A4) .38 
To see this, consider the special case in 
which ethical costs are independent of the 
individual's wealth position, i.e., C(L, T, W) 
= C(L, T). Under this condition (A4) may be 
rewritten as follows: 
(A4') aT/a'Y 
= ( [- Uw(W)+Uw(W)J 
· [(VO' -r)+Cr.(L, T)-CT(L, T)] 
-FOUww(W) [((V -F)O'- r) 
+Cr.(L, T)-CT(L, T)]l /GTT 
Equation (A4') is the result obtained by 
Ehrlich and is in fact identical to his expres-
sion for a compensated change in p except 
for the fact that in (A4') ethical costs have 
not been aggregated into "net" returns.39 
It is straightforward to show that the sign 
of (A4') is uniquely determined by the sign 
of Uww. 4° For example, if the individual is 
38 ::Yfore precisely in the Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjo-
quist models, aT jay~O iff Uww50. 
39 See Ehrlich, fn. 13, p. 530. 
40To see this, note that ((V-F)O'-r+CL(L, 
T)-CT(L, T))<O and (VO'-r+CL(L, T)-CT(L, 
T)) >0 by the first-order condition and GTT<O by the 
second-order condition. Therefore the sign of the first 
term on the right-hand side of (A-4') will be determined 
by the sign of U ww. Since the sign of this term will be 
opposite that of Vww, the sign of Uww uniquely de-
termines the sign of (A-4'). In fact, with Cw = 0, 
aTjay~O iff Uww50. 
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risk averse (A4') will be positive and a com-
pensated increase in the arrest rate will in-
crease the individual's allocation to illegal 
activities. In other words, under the condi-
tion that ethical costs are in de pendent of 
wealth, a decrease in the dispersion of returns 
to illegal activities will, when the density is 
Bernoulli, unambiguously lead a risk-averse 
(risk-preferring) individual to increase (de-
crease) his supply of such activities. Crucial 
in this result is the specific density and the 
independence of ethical costs and wealth. As 
we have shown above, if the density is not 
Bernoulli and/ or ethical costs are not inde-
pendent of wealth, simple behavior toward 
risk is not sufficient to establish the effect of 
mean preserving dispersion changes. 
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